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I. INTRODUCTION 
When zealously advocating a client's position, the lawyer's ulti-
mate goal is winning. To win, however, the lawyer must convince a 
judge or jury to accept the lawyer's (and reject opposing counsel's) 
position. The best type of advocate accomplishes this goal using var-
ious rhetorical techniques, attempting to manage other people's per-
ceptions of such things as the facts, the lawyer's own theory of the 
case, the credibility of eyewitness testimony, the weaknesses of op-
posing counsel's claims, and the praiseworthiness of the lawyer's 
own client. By design, we have an adversary system. Roberto Aron 
and his colleagues characterize litigation quite deftly. 
Litigation is not a philosophical discussion. Trial advocacy is always 
controversial. A trial is a judicial contest between lawyers where a 
given situation and set of facts are interpreted in various ways by 
the different parties' lawyers, each counsel trying to persuade the 
judge or jury that justice is on the side of the client for whom coun-
sel is arguing. 1 
But how does the lawyer successfully convince the fact finder 
that the lawyer's (and not opposing counsel's) position is aligned 
with justice? Success inevitably boils down to persuasive legal argu-
mentation.2 This is because "the advocate's [only] weapons in the 
courtroom battle are methods, tactics, and strategies, all of which 
have in common the ultimate goal of persuasion."3 When lawyers do 
battle in the courtroom, whichever warrior wages war while wisely 
wielding wittier words without waning will win. Thus, if the lawyer's 
ultimate goal is winning, the lawyer must master the art of persua-
sion. For the art of persuasion4 is intimately connected with the psy-
l. See ROBERTO ARON ET AL., TRIAL COMMUNICATION SKILLS§ 1.14 (2d ed. 2011). 
2. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 672 (3d ed. 2011) (defining 
argumentation as "the art of logically setting forth premises and drawing conclusions from 
them"). 
3. ARON ET AL., supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
4. RONALD WAICUKAUSKI, PAUL MARK SANDLER & jOANNE EPPS, THE 12 SECRETS OF 
PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT, at v (2009) ("The art of persuasion is at the heart of the successful ad-
vocate's skill set .... The essence that the great advocate adds to fact and law is an assessment 
of their implications for her client's case, and an understanding of the way that the facts and law 
support her overall rationale. It is equally important to explain and refute the opposing facts and 
law. That approach is essential to being an effective lawyer-advocate and to the art of persua-
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chological process of perception. And perception is what convinces 
people whether to accept or reject the lawyer's argument. 
In this Comment, I propose an account of legal argumentation 
that explains the relationship between mental processes that psy-
chologists label cognitive biases5 and legal arguments that philoso-
phers label informal fallacies. 6 Cognitive biases are errors in our 
thinking and reasoning, which alter our perceptions. Informal fal-
lacies are verbal or written arguments containing material flaws, 
which enhance their persuasiveness. 7 I also describe the process of 
persuasion at play when the lawyer uses legal arguments that con-
tain informal (material) fallacies. By using legal arguments that con-
tain informal fallacies, the lawyer can play upon the listener's inher-
ent cognitive biases to persuade the listener to see things the same 
way the lawyer does. When lawyers use these rhetorical tech-
niques-whether before or during trial proceedings-they induce8 in 
most listeners erroneous perceptions that can, and often do, power-
fully alter their listeners' beliefs. 
sian."). 
5. Cognitive bias generally describes numerous "observer effects" in the mind, which are 
"desires and expectations people possess [that] influence their perceptions and interpretations 
of what they observe." D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. I, 6 (2002). 
6. Throughout this Comment, I predominantly use the term informal fallacy instead of 
the three-extra-syllable term informal logical fallacy. In legal circles, informal fallacies might also 
be familiarly known as "material fallacies." E.g., Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1439 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (Aldisert, )., concurring and dissenting) ("The arguments contain material fallacies, 
that is, errors or evasions that appear only through an analysis of the meaning of the terms, ra-
ther than an analysis of the logical form." (emphasis added)), vacated, 493 U.S. 801 (1989); see 
also RUGGEROj. ALDISERT, THE jUDICIAL PROCESS 635-44 (1976). 
7. See RUGGERO]. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 141 
(3d ed. 1997). Judge Aldisert defines informal (material) fallacies as follows: 
I d. 
An informal fallacy is one that cannot be detected merely by examining the form of 
the argument but must be detected in some other way. It is any other argument that 
does not properly establish the supported conclusion. An argument contains an in-
formal fallacy when at least one of its premises is not true, or when the rules of infer-
ence are not properly respected. 
8. W AICUKAUSKI ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 ("As a lawyer, your goal is to make the argu-
ment that not merely impresses but ... induces the desired action. Everything you say or do in 
making an argument should be determined on the basis of whether it will help to induce the de-
sired outcome." (emphasis added)). 
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I also analyze specific informal fallacies and specific cognitive bi-
ases as well as their potential to improve or undermine the legal sys-
tem. I focus on cognitive biases that affect how we understand, wit-
ness, remember, and investigate things in our world. I also concen-
concentrate on informal fallacies of presumption, 9 which argue from 
unwarranted assumptions and fail to establish their conclusion. By 
analyzing the relationship between several cognitive biases and in-
formal fallacies, I hope to show how both types of errors influence 
the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 
My first general purpose is to explain what lawyers and judges 
can learn from psychologists' and philosophers' insights on legal ar-
gumentation.10 There is a connection between perception and per-
suasion-namely, that cognitive biases (linked to perception) and in-
formal fallacies (linked to persuasion) are merely two different labels 
used to describe faulty reasoning as it occurs in one of three phases 
in the reasoning process: (1) the arguer's mental process in which a 
specific bias influences how she interprets her perceptions and how 
she is persuaded to believe something; (2) the arguer's rhetorical 
process in which she uses a specific tool or argument to persuade the 
listener to perceive and believe as she believes; and (3) the listener's 
mental process in which a specific bias influences his perceptions of 
the arguer's reasoning and persuades him to believe as she does. 
An example helps to illustrate what I mean. After a man dies in a 
helicopter crash, his family sues the helicopter manufacturer. At tri-
al, their lawyer argues that "the manufacturer negligently designed 
9. Fallacies of Presumption, LOGICAL FALLACIES, http:/ /www.logicalfallacies.info/ presump-
tion (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) ("Fallacies of presumption are not errors of reasoning in the 
sense of logical errors, but are nevertheless commonly classed as fallacies. Fallacies of presump-
tion begin with a false (or at least unwarranted) assumption, and so fail to establish their con-
clusion."); Fallacies of Presumption, PHIL. PAGES, http://www.philosophypages.com/ lg/e06b.htm 
(last updated Nov. 12, 2011) ("The fallacies of presumption also fail to provide adequate reason 
for believing the truth of their conclusions. In these instances, however, the erroneous reasoning 
results from an implicit supposition of some further proposition whose truth is uncertain or im-
plausible."). 
lO. E.g., Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.]. 1, 122 
(!998) ("This psychological approach views legal argument as a form of human reasoning. Legal 
argumentation is treated as the making of inferences-described generally as the mental opera-
tion by which we generate propositions on the basis of some existing knowledge. Legal argu-
ments, thus, are viewed as inferences that lead to propositions, which ultimately have implica-
tions for decisions."). 
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the helicopter and that the negligent design caused the helicopter to 
crash." 11 The argument is flawed, however, because it "ignores the 
possibility of pilot error or maintenance or other human failure as 
possible causes." 12 The philosopher's label for such an argument is 
false-cause fallacy, which asserts that two events are causally connect-
ed when no causation has actually been established. 13 The lawyer 
and the jury have known of only a few helicopter crashes, and none 
was caused by pilot error. The jury listens as the lawyer directs an 
expert witness who testifies about the crash. The expert testimony 
combined with the lawyer's past knowledge of only a few helicopter 
crashes persuades the lawyer to make the false-cause argument 
above. In turn, that argument induces the jury to form a faulty per-
ception that negligent manufacturing caused the crash. The psy-
chologist's label for such thought processes is illusory correlation, 
which is an inaccurate perception that a relationship exists between 
a certain action and an effect (often based on past experience). 14 
Thus, the informal fallacy describes the lawyer's faulty argument, 
and the cognitive bias describes the lawyer and jury's faulty beliefs. 
11. Harold F. Greeson, Fear of Lawsuits Makes People, Companies More Responsible Personal Inju-
ry Lawsuite: Arbiters of justice or Costly Cash Cows? To Sue or Not to Sue?, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., 
Feb. 6, 1994, at F1, available at 1994 WLNR 4938577. 
12. John G. Englar, Editorial, Personal Injury Lawyer Makes a Poor Argument, GREENSBORO 
NEWS & REC., Feb. 19, 1994, at A9, available at 1994 WLNR 4944137. 
13. WILLIAM F. LAWHEAD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY: AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH app. 
A-8 (3d ed. 2006). The false-cause fallacy may also be referred to as cum hoc ergo propter hoc or 
correlation proves causation. See, e.g., Bull v. City & Cnty. ofS.F., 595 F.3d 964,990 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Thomas, ]., dissenting) (" [T]he government's entire argument is based on the logical fallacy 
cum hoc ergo propter hoc-happenstance implies causation. The government argues that contraband 
has been found in the San Francisco jails. Thus, the government reasons, individuals who are 
arrested must be smuggling contraband into the jail. Therefore, the government concludes it 
must body cavity search everyone who is arrested, even those who pose no risk of concealing 
contraband, much less of trying to smuggle contraband into the jail."). 
14. See Illusory Correlation, ALLEYDOG.COM, http:/ /www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition. 
php?term=IllusoryCorrelation (last visited Jan 28, 2013) ("For example, you may have had 
some experiences with lawyers, some good, some not so good. It is possible that you only recall 
the bad experiences (maybe where you felt as though you were lied to by the lawyers) which 
leads you to formulate the conclusion that all lawyers are liars. Thus, you could come to associ-
ate (wrongly?) lawyers with lying, and conclude that all lawyers are liars."). Related to illusory 
correlation is the availability heuristic, which describes our tendency to make judgments about 
probability and causation based on how easily events come to mind that either are vivid or are a 
recent experience. See PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION 
MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 253 (2010). 
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My second general purpose is to promote a new framework for 
viewing the use of informal fallacies in legal argumentation. Lawyers 
use informal fallacies as a strategy of persuasion to induce cognitive 
biases in other people's thinking, to effectively manage their percep-
tions, and to ultimately change their beliefs. While informal fallacies 
can be used deceptively15-and philosophers condemn and try to ex-
cise them from argumentation completely16-they can play an essen-
tial role in good legal argumentation and effective advocacy. 17 Infor-
mal fallacies may help to persuade the listener to actually care about 
the outcome of a case and to see things the way the lawyer sees 
them. Similarly, while cognitive biases are generally viewed as a hin-
drance to the truth18-and psychologists catalogue and study their 
negative impact on eyewitness testimony19-they can play an essen-
tial role in good legal proceedings.2° Cognitive biases may help even 
the most simple-minded listener to perceive each lawyer's version of 
the case and to determine which to believe. Thus, good legal argu-
ments and proper judicial proceedings can still involve both types of 
error in reasoning. 
15. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 676 (9th ed. 2009) (defining fallacy as an "unsound, and 
usu[ally] deceptive, argument or inference" (emphasis added)). 
16. ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 143 ("Informal fallacies can sneak up on us. They are also 
called material fallacies because they deal with content and context of premises. Logicians, scien-
tists and other careful scholars are especially adept at detecting and avoiding these."); LAWHEAD, 
supra note 13, app. A-2. 
17. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 780 
(2004) ("If one were scrupulously to avoid all of these types of logical error, it would be almost 
impossible to be effective as a lawyer. Not only does the law tolerate logical error, but competent 
lawyers are expected to know how and when, and in what manner and to what extent, to make 
arguments that would be considered fallacious by logicians."). 
18. Michael B. Metzger, Bridging the Gaps: Cognitive Constraints on Corporate Control & Ethics 
Education, 16 U. FLA. j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 435, 497 (2005) ("It seems reasonable to question any 
notion of 'mental health' that denies the truth and the nature of reality."). 
19. See generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); HUGO 
MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME (Mark Hatala ed., 
Greentop Academic Press 2009) (1908). 
20. See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 291, 300-01, 365 (2004) (arguing that cognitive biases benefit not only the evi-
dentiary process by helping to weasel out insincere witnesses but also the law as a whole, that 
"the law relies upon mental limitations, that it exploits cognitive shortcomings, and that it 
would not function nearly as well were humans truly perfectly rational"). 
324 
319 Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation 
In Part II, I define the main theoretical concepts used throughout 
this Comment and recount some particularly relevant history. 
Whenever possible, I try to give concrete examples to help the reader 
understand how informal fallacies and cognitive biases describe the 
link between perception and persuasion at different stages in the 
reasoning process. In Part III, I illustrate how these errors have af-
fected the reliability of eyewitness testimony in actual legal proceed-
ings. In Part IV, I explore the connection between specific informal 
fallacies and specific cognitive biases. Finally, in Part V, I conclude 
with a brief note on logic and reasoning. 
II. KEY CONCEPTS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In this Part, I attempt to lend a proper understanding of the vari-
ous concepts, processes, and terms I use throughout this Comment. 
In doing so, I also detail some of the historical background needed to 
appreciate the philosophical overtones at play. In Section A, I define 
the concepts of perception and persuasion and briefly describe how 
they interact with one another. In Section B, I explain informal falla-
cies and cognitive biases and give several specific examples of each. 
In Section C, I provide background information to develop the cur-
rent context within which these various elements of law, logic, rhet-
oric, and psychology combine to provide an account of legal argu-
mentation. 
A. Perception and Persuasion 
1. Perception21 
Perception refers to the way in which the brain processes, inter-
prets, and assi~ns meaning to sensory information gathered from the 
environment. 2 Perception enables an actor to find what is real and 
what is true, although it "includes both the actor's knowledge of 
21. Oxford English Dictionary defines perception as both "[t]he process of becoming 
aware of physical objects, phenomena, etc., through the senses" and "[t]he mental product or 
result of perceiving something.'' Perception, OED.COM, http:/ /www.oed.com/view/Entry/140560 
?redirectedFrom=perception (last visited jan. 30, 2013) (subscription required). 
22. Christopher L. Heffner, Psychology 101, Ch. 5: Sensation and Perception, ALLPSYCH 
ONLINE, http:/ /allpsych.com/psychologylOl/perception.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
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the actual circumstances and the actor's erroneous but reasonable be-
lief in the existence of nonexistent circumstances."23 
Perception encompasses all three epistemological points of view: 
the objective, the subjective, and the relative.24 The objective point 
of view is material reality, or the world as most people know it. The 
subjective point of view is specific to the person who is doing the 
perceiving. The relative point of view is contextual, dealing with 
things such as changes in light, color frequencies, and differences re-
sulting from perspective. People's perceptions help them to make 
sense of the world by forming basic beliefs, "ideas, emotions, atti-
tudes, and opinions [that] strongly influence their actions."25 
It is useful to think about perception as an ever-changing percep-
tual field, made up of the total environment and the individual per-
ceiver who interprets what he is experiencing at the same time he is 
acting.26 While each individual's perceptual field is filled with poten-
tially millions of different stimuli, the individual does not, and can-
not, take note of each one.27 In truth, the individual "perceives those 
things in his environment or field which relate to his wants and 
needs of that moment."28 And one of the individual's most basic 
needs is to perceive that he plays an important role within his total 
environment-an environment comprising not only his physical and 
psychological self, but also his cultural values, societal norms, politi-
cal ideologies, social affiliations, and familial obligations.29 The indi-
vidual's perception of himself in relation to these factors is his self-
image Oi personality, which he tries to protect and to sustain in an 
ordered way within his own perceptual field. 30 Since the individual's 
perceptual field is an ever-changing environment, the individual's 
most important need becomes feeling adequate "to face up to his en-
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1250 (9th ed. 2009). 
24. See generally LAWHEAD, supra note 13, at 50-180. 
25. RICHARD M. BAKER, )R. & GREGG PHIFER, SALESMANSHIP: COMMUNICATION, 
PERSUASION, PERCEPTION 116 (1966). 
26. Id. at 117. 
27. Id. at 119. 
28. I d. 
29. Id. at 122. 
30. I d. 
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vironment each day."31 This quest for personal adequacy provides 
the motivation needed to drive behavior. 32 Having a basic under-
standing of this link between perception, motivation, and behavior 
will be helpful to grasp how persuasion can influence perception. 
Perception and memory are malleable and susceptible to the per-
suasion of a skilled attorney or investigator. This is clearly illustrated 
in the body of research on eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness-
testimony research studies perception and memory together as a 
three-stage process: acquisition, retention, and retrieval. 33 During 
the acquisition stage, a witness perceives an event, and that infor-
mation then enters the memory system.34 The retention stage is the 
period of time that passes before a witness attempts to remember 
the event.35 And the retrieval stage describes the witness's attempt 
to recall the stored information. 36 Accuracy during the retrieval stage 
is notoriously suspect because of the influence of system variables, 
which are "manipulable in actual legal proceedings (for example, the 
types of questions asked of a witness or the type of lineup 
shown)."37 
2. Persuasion 
Since the term persuasion often has negative connotations, I begin 
by defining what it is not for pur~oses of this Comment. When the 
average person talks about lawyers 8 using rhetoric39 to persuade, per-
31. Id. at 123. 
32. Id. at 124. 
33. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL§ 2-2 (4th 
ed. 2007). Eyewitness-testimony research is then divided into two categories that study the dif-
ferent variables affecting accuracy at these stages of perception and memory: estimator-variable 
and system-variable research. Id. While both lines of research are highly valuable, I draw mostly 
upon system-variable research because of its focus on the retrieval stage and system variables' 
susceptibility to manipulation by outside forces. 
34. Id. Accuracy at the acquisition stage is affected by estimator variables, which "cannot 
be controlled by police/investigators in actual cases (for example, how frightened the witness 
was at the time of the initial perception or whether a weapon was used during the commission 




38. Lawyers seem to inhabit a particularly low place among public opinion. E.g., 
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suasion is often used pejoratively to mean manipulation. According 
to Professor Scharffs, "Rhetoric is not only the art of persuasion, it is 
the art of manipulation."40 
In this Comment, persuasion does not refer to a process that in-
volves manipulation or coercion, nor does it include telling outright 
lies or distorting the truthY For coercion "uses intimidation, 
threats, or pressure to force an individual to think or act in a certain 
way; [and] manipulation influences deviousness."42 Other manipula-
tive tricks, such as "brainwashing, h~notic suggestion, propaganda, 
half-truths, lies, and misstatements" should not be confused with 
persuasive rhetoric used in the courtroom. Celia Childress aptly dis-
tinguishes between true persuasion and manipulation. 
Persuasion is in itself compelling, but it does not compel; persua-
sion changes the action of the one persuaded because his or her 
basic belief and thoughts on a subject are changed by what is seen 
or heard, not from force and not from reluctance. True persuasion, 
unlike manipulation, does not entail a person reluctantly overcom-
ing misgivings to agree with the manipulator for reasons of their 
own. Unlike manipulation, true and complete persuasion is perma-
nent; it does not change when the manipulator is out of sight and 
hearing.44 
Paul Mark Sandler, Secrets of Persuading a jury, ART Anvoc. (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.attorney 
advocacy.com/2010/09/secrets_of_persuading_ajury.html ("'t's no secret that the general pub-
lic has a low opinion of lawyers."). It may be that lawyers are the ones keeping themselves down 
in public opinion. For example, as one lawyer writes candidly: "When we argue, especially where 
resources are at stake, instead of functioning as truth-seeking beings, we more often argue like 
lawyers, employing many techniques to deflect, distort, distract[,] and destroy, rather than seek-
ing to recognize the substantial common ground that often exists between two arguing parties." 
Erich Vieth, The Function of Reason, DANGEROUS INTERSECTION (Aug. I5, 20 II), 
http:/ I dangerousintersection.org/20 Il/08/I5/the-function-of-reason. 
39. Scharffs, supra note I7, at 772 ("The primary difficulty with rhetoric is its win-at-any-
costs mentality that a desired end justifies any means. With victory as the ultimate measure of 
success, rhetoric has developed a terrible reputation."). 
40. Id. at 772-73. 
41. Celia W. Childress, An Introduction to Persuasion in the Courtroom: What Makes a Trial 
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The point is that the lawyer's use of persuasion does not neces-
sarily involve trying to bend other people's wills to her own but ra-
ther involves getting others to see things the way she sees them. 
Thus, perhaps to distinguish from manipulative persuasion, Black's 
Law Dictionary defines fair persuasion: "Argument, exhortation, or per-
suasion that does not involve harassment, threats, or misrepresenta-
tions."45 
For present purposes, persuasion primarily describes the act or 
process used "to move by argument, entreaty, or expostulation to a 
belief, position, or course of action."46 Notice that persuade, "[t]o in-
duce (another) to do something,"47 is a transitive verb;48 that is, 
persuasion always involves two actors-the subject doing the per-
suading and the object being persuaded. One person can play both 
roles (person A persuades herself to believe X), or two people can 
each play a role (person A persuades person B to believe Y). Persua-
sion also requires movement: the arguer moves the listener from be-
lief X to belief Y. "Persuasion is, in sum, the purpose of trial com-
munication."49 
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (9th ed. 2009). 
46. Persuade, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http:/ /www.merriam-webster .com/dictionary/persuade 
(last visited jan. 30, 2013). 
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (9th ed. 2009); GARNER, supra note 2, at 672 ("One 
persuades another to do something, but one convinces or, archaically, persuades another of some-
thing. Either persuade or convince may be used with a that-phrase object, although persuade that 
occurs seldom outside law. American judges seem addicted to the expression."); cf Shelly L. 
Chaiken, Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Charles M. judd, Chapter 7: Persuasion in Negotiations and Con-
flict Situations, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Morton 
Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000), available at 
http:/ /common.books24x7.com/toc.aspx?bookid=2508. Chaiken and her colleagues note that in 
the negotiation context, actors attempt to convince each other to adopt a position contrary to 
their currently held positions. 
!d. 
We define persuasion as the principles and processes by which people's attitudes, be-
liefs, and behaviors are formed, are modified, or resist change in the face of others' at-
tempts at influence. These attempts are designed to convince targets of persuasion to 
accept a position on some policy issue or plan of action that is typically contrary to 
their existing attitudes, beliefs, or practices. 
48. THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE Cf 5.96 (16th ed. 2010) ("A transitive verb requires an 
object to express a complete thought; the verb indicates what action the subject exerts on the 
object. For example, the cyclist hit a curb states what the subject cyclist did to the object curb."). 
49. ARON ET AL., supra note 1. 
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Persuasion is best accomplished through the mastery of rhetoric, 
which teaches that ethos, pathos, and logos are the three basic parts 
of persuasion that make speakers successful. 50 Ethos centers on the 
speaker's character and good faith, pathos focuses on the speaker's 
emotional appeal, and logos deals with the speaker's logic and rea-
soning. Of the three, ethos, or character, 51 is the most persuasive, 
because we are persuaded most by those we trust. 52 Aristotle taught 
that what the audience believes to be true is more important than 
what is proven to be true, that the speaker should endeavor to use 
every method of persuasion he possesses to persuade the audience, 
and that the speaker should adjust and use the best type of emotion-
al appeal in each situation to receive the best emotional response 
from the audience.53 
3. The interaction between perception and persuasion 
My discussion here of perception and persuasion has been neces-
sarily abbreviated. But the skilled, successful advocate must under-
stand the intricacies of both processes in far greater detail. When 
seeking to persuade, the lawyer's basic goal must be to change the 
listener's frame of reference-the set of ideas and assumptions that 
control how the listener perceives and understands something. 54 
This is part of the listener's perceptualfield,55 which is fundamental to 
motivation and behavior. The lawyer must seek to help fulfill the lis-
tener's need for personal adequacy. The lawyer persuades the listen-
er by using the various "methods, tactics, and strategies" of rhetoric 
50. Childress, supra note 41, § 32; Melissa H. Weresh, Morality, Trust, and Illusion: Ethos as 
Relationship, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 229, 232 (2012) ("Logos, ethos, and pathos all 
contribute to persuasion in legal argument."). 
51. Scharffs, supra note 17, at 781 ("Ethos, rather than just a matter of reputation, image, 
or persona, is really a matter of character."); Weresh, supra note 50, at 229 ("Ethos is character. 
Character implicates trust. Trust is based on relationship. Relationship persuades."). 
52. Scharffs, supra note 17, at 781 ("Consider Aristotle's insight that the most persuasive 
form of rhetoric is ethos, or character. If we have confidence in the character of the person mak-
ing an argument, if we trust him, we are more likely to be persuaded by what he has to say."). 
53. Childress, supra note 40, § 36. 
54. Frame of Reference, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
frame%20of%20reference (last visited jan. 30, 2013). 
55. See supra Part Il.A.l. 
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to fine-tune the listener's perceptions.56 If successful, the lawyer 
convinces the listener to effectively see eye-to-eye on things. 57 This 
is because the skilled lawyer recognizes that "narratives, ideas, and 
ideologies are what fuel the world, not facts," 58 and that "[b]eing 
correct ... isn't the same thing as being persuasive."59 
Thus, through rhetorical techniques that engender trustworthi-
ness, satisfy the listener's sense of good reason, and appropriately 
appeal to the listener's emotions, the lawyer can persuasively adapt 
and mold the listener's perceptions of the objective, the subjective, 
and the relative to align the listener's beliefs with his own. 60 
B. Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases 
Using this working understanding of perception and persuasion, 
I first explain the concept of informal logical fallacies. I then describe 
the concept of cognitive biases. Finally, I give a preliminary explana-
tion of the relationship between informal fallacies and cognitive bi-
ases. 
1. Informal fallacies 
While there is wide disagreement among philosofhers and logi-
cians about a precise definition for the term fallacy, 6 it is generally 
56. ARON ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.14. Many of these methods, tactics, and strategies of 
communication are informal fallacies. See infra Part II.B.l. 
57. BAKER & PHIFER, supra note 25, at 137. 
58. Rebecca J. Rosen, Truth, Lies, and the Internet, ATLANTIC (Dec. 29, 2011, 2:23 PM), 
http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/12/truth-lies-and-the-internet/250569. 
59. William McGurn, How Obama's 'Life ofjulia' Prevailed, WALL ST.]., Nov. 27, 2012, at 
A 15, available at http:/ /online. wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324469304578143344246556 
774.html. For a clearly incorrect, but somehow persuasive, interactive website explaining liberal 
policies and denigrating conservative policies, see The Life of julia, BARACK OBAMA 2012, 
http:/ /www.barackobama.com/life-of-julia (last visited Nov. 28, 2012). 
60. See, e.g., DAVID A. SOUSA, HOW BRAIN SCIENCE CAN MAKE You A BETTER LAWYER, at xiv 
(2009) ("Lawyers and judges are like teachers in one very important aspect: They often try to 
change someone's brain."). 
61. The Internet is rich with information about the various types of logical fallacies. See 
Bradley Dowden, Fallacies, INTERNET ENCYC. PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy (last updated 
Dec. 31, 2010) (content may also be accessed through an alternate domain, DEWSBERRY.COM, 
http:/ I dews berry .com/ content/ es/content/reference/fallacies/fallacies.htm); Charles Ess, Infor-
mal Fallacies, DRURY.EDU, http:/ /www.drury.edu/ess/Logic/lnformal/Overview.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013); LOGICAL FALLACIES, http://www.logicalfallacies.info (last visited Feb. 3, 2013); 
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agreed that fallacies are mistakes in reasoning that involve ambiguity 
and vagueness. 62 A fallacy can be a type of error in an argument, a 
type of error in reasoning (such as arguing, defining, and explain-
ing), a false belief, or a rhetorical technique that causes any of these 
errors.63 For present purposes, fallacy refers either to errors in the 
substance of arguments (as opposed to errors in the arguer's think-
ing) or to the rhetorical tools that cause these errors. Fallacies are 
also described as being either formal or informal. Formal fallacies are 
concerned with highly technical errors in the logical structure of the 
argument. 64 Legal arguments rarely65 contain formal fallacies. 66 
Taxonomy of the Logical Fallacies, FALLACY FILES, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/taxonomy.html (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013). 
62. Dowden, supra note 61 ("The term 'fallacy' is not a precise term. One reason is that it 
is ambiguous."). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. Formal fallacies are typically studied as part of a course on categorical, statement, 
and predicate logic. See generally FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER, DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER & RYAN 
WASSERMAN, THE POWER OF LOGIC (5th ed. 2012). 
65. Though rare, legal arguments containing formal fallacies do appear from time to 
time-even in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Cory S. Clements, Note, judicial Takings in Vandevere v. 
Lloyd, 2012 BYU L. REV. 423, 438-39 & n.ll7 (construing Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 
966-67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011)). 
[T]he Ninth Circuit's reasoning . . . is a non-sequitur. Logically speaking, the ar-
gument is invalid because it denies the antecedent, taking the following form: If (A), 
then (B). (Not-A). So, (not-B). To make sense of how the court's reasoning is faulty, 
one must supply the implicit premises, (A) and (B), because the court's argument 
made explicit only the contrapositives, (Not-A) and (Not-B). Thus, the argument with 
its implicit premises reads as follows: 
If (A) Lucas's remand order concerned the extent of the property interest, then 
(B) the extent of the property interest is not a matter of state law. (Not-A) Lu-
cas's remand order "did not concern the extent of the property interest." So, 
(not-B) "the extent of the property interest" "is a matter of state law." 
Id. (footnote omitted) ("[T]he Court's quarrel with the state supreme court did not concern the 
extent of the property interest in the beachfront land, which the Court's remand order firmly sug-
gests is a matter of state law but, rather, concerned the extent to which the state could invade a prop-
erty interest without providing just compensation, which is a matter of federal law." (quoting 
Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964)). 
For an in-depth explanation of how to recognize legal arguments that commit the fallacy 
of denying the antecedent, see Stephen M. Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Deny-
ing the Antecedent as a Litigation Tool, 79 Miss. L.J. 669, 683 (2010) (" [W]here the rules of logic are 
not observed, the argument takes the form of a fallacy. The Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent is 
one fallacy that results from failure to observe the logical rules. Where the argument denies the 
antecedent term of the hypothetical syllogism, it violates the rule that requires the antecedent 
term be affirmed. Accordingly, when the antecedent term is denied, the argument commits the 
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Informal fallacies are concerned not with the form but with the 
content (and possibly the intent) of the reasoning.67 They are 
"proofs that appear at first glance to be sound but are fatally flawed 
in their reasoning or construction."68 And from a psychology per-
spective, "a fallacy is often defined as a mistake in reasoning used for 
deceptive purposes."69 While this certainly is not categorically true 
of all informal fallacies, "many of the informal fallacies are often 
used in the manipulation of opinion." 70 Informal fallacies can also be 
difficult to identify. For instance, a slippery-slope argument often 
straddles the line between being persuasively plausible and falla-
ciously exaggerated. 71 For present purposes, a fallacious argument is 
either inductively very weak, or contains an unjustified premise, or 
ignores relevant, available evidence that the arguer should know 
about, and the argument can be used to persuade.72 
While there is some disagreement about how to classify and la-
bel various fallacies, there is generally agreement about how to de-
tect, define, and describe them?3 The three broad categories are fal-
Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent and is logically invalid."). 
66. This is because formal fallacies are easier to spot than informal fallacies. E.g., Stephen 
M. Rice, Indiscernible Logic: Using the Logical Fallacies of the Illicit Major Term and the Illicit Minor Term 
as Litigation Tools, 47 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 101, 107 (2010) ("These illogical arguments, called 
fallacies, can be identified by the pattern of an argument's form, which makes them easy to iden-
tify, describe, and discredit."). judge Aldisert defines formal fallacy as follows: 
A formal fallacy is any violation of any of the six rules of the categorical syllogism or 
the rules of the hypothetical or disjunctive -alternative syllogism. It is an argument 
whose conclusion could be false even if all its premises are true. It can be detected 
merely by examining the form (hence its name) or structure of the argument. 
ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 141. 
67. LAWHEAD, supra note 13, app. A-9 (stating that informal fallacies are "a type of bad 
reasoning that can only be detected by examining the content of the argument"). 
68 ARON ET AL., supra note 1, § 1:12. 
69. Introduction to Logic: Informal Fallacies, P.L.E., http:/ /philosophy.lander.edu/logic/fall 
acy_topics.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
70. Id. 
71. E.g., Mitchell F. Park, Comment, Defining One's Own Concept of Existence and the Meaning 
of the Universe: The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas, 2006 BYU L. REV. 837, 881 n.191 
("Suppose someone claims that a first step (in a chain of causes and effects, or a chain of reason-
ing) will probably lead to a second step that in turn will probably lead to another step and so on 
until a final step ends in trouble. If the likelihood of the trouble occurring is exaggerated, the 
slippery slope fallacy is committed." (quoting Dowden, supra note 61)). 
72. Dowden, supra note 61. 
73. ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 140-41 ("Although there is often agreement as to the exist-
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lades of ambiguity, of presumption, and of relevance. 74 In this 
Comment, I primarily focus on fallacies of presumption and of rele-
vance. 75 The specific informal fallacies I use in this Comment in-
clude the following: false cause, 76 irrelevant thesis, 77 red herring, 78 
exclusion, 79 style over substance, 80 emotive or loaded language, 81 
poisoning the well, and the straw man. 82 
2. Cognitive biases 
Phenomena studied in social psychology and cognitive science, 
cognitive biases are common mistakes and predispositions in mental 
processing that affect people's beliefs and understandings of the 
world. 83 The term cognitive bias generally describes numerous "ob-
server effects" in the mind, which are "desires and expectations peo-
ence of a fallacious argument, the method of labeling or characterizing them is up for grabs. 
Each logician seems to have an idiosyncratic method of classification."). For an opinion that la-
ments for a catalogue of the most common logical fallacies that lawyers use, see United Shipyards 
v. Hoey, 131 F.2d 525, 526 (2d Cir. 1942) ("It would be time-saving if we had a descriptive cata-
logue of recurrent types of fallacies encountered in arguments addressed to the courts, giving 
each of them a number, so that, in a particular case, we could say, 'This is an instance of Fallacy 
No.-Such a device would be helpful here." (footnote omitted)). 
74. Taxonomy of Fallacies, LOGICAL FALLACIES, http:/ /www.logicalfallacies.info (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2013) ("The most common classification of fallacies groups fallacies of relevance, of am-
biguity, and of presumption."). 
75. I chose not to address fallacies of ambiguity in this Comment simply because they are 
harder to identify and describe, which makes them less useful in illustrating the connection be-
tween informal fallacies and cognitive biases. See Fallacies of Ambiguity, PHIL. PAGES, 
http://www.philosophypages.com/lg!e06c.htm (last modified Nov. 12, 2011) ("There are sever-
al patterns of incorrect reasoning that arise from the imprecise use of language. An ambiguous 
word, phrase, or sentence is one that has two or more distinct meanings. The inferential rela-
tionship between the propositions included in a single argument will be sure to hold only if we 
are careful to employ exactly the same meaning in each of them. The fallacies of ambiguity all 
involve a confusion of two or more different senses."). 
76. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
77. See infra Part III.B.2.b, notes 158-169 and accompanying text. 
78. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
79. See infra Part IV.B, notes 170-82 and accompanying text. 
80. See infra Part IV.C, notes 183-86 and accompanying text. 
81. See infra Part IV.D, notes 192-98 and accompanying text. 
82. See infra Part IV.E, notes 203-06 and accompanying text. 
83. See, e.g., Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1148 ("[E]mployees suffer from cognitive biases that 
may inhibit them from spotting and reporting wrongdoing."). 
334 
319 Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation 
pie possess [that] influence their perceptions and interpretations of 
what they observe."84 Individuals are susceptible to a slew of biases, 
sometimes more than one at a time.85 Cognitive biases may also be 
closely tied to self-perception and the need for personal adequacy. 
Many are heuristic tools, or mental rules of thumb, that attempt to 
create clarity amid chaos, giving the individual a sense of order and 
meaning.86 While they are helpful in ordering our life experiences, 
cognitive biases often cause distorted perceptions, erroneous judg-
ment, and faulty decision making_B? In general, cognitive biases can 
significantly distort the reliability of legal and anecdotal evidence. 88 
Daniel Kahneman describes a clear way to understand our men-
tal processes by dividing them into two categories: System 1 and Sys-
tem 2. 89 "System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or 
no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2 allocates atten-
84. Risinger eta!., supra note 5. 
85. Mario J. Rizzo & Doglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 
BYU L. REV. 905, 951 (citing Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a Balanced Social 
Psychology: Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cog-
nition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 313, 317 tbl.l (2004)) (noting that hundreds of studies have 
identified "myriad cognitive and behavioral biases," sometimes two or more in a study, and ar-
guing that "individuals are subject to multiple biases"). 
86. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2000) (explaining how 
"decision-making heuristics that simplify decision-making tasks" reduce both information-
processing and decision-making costs, thus making it possible for us "to operate in an increas-
ingly complex world"). 
87. Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, jury Decision Making: Implications For and From Psy-
chology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 63, 64 (2011) ("People often rely on heuristics 
that can lead to erroneous judgments, and they have difficulty compartmentalizing their 
knowledge."). 
88. WILLIAM R. UTTAL, HUMAN FACTORS IN THE COURTROOM: MYTHOLOGY VERSUS SCIENCE 
165-66 (2006) (" [M]ost people's memories are highly fallible, with temporal order and spatial 
arrangement, not to mention the significance of our recollections, increasingly distorted as time 
passes. The bottom line is that there are many influences that can grossly distort our memories. 
In spite of this fragility of what we remember, witnesses are called upon to produce detailed re-
ports of previous experiences in the courtroom."); Cognitive Bias, Sci. DAILY, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/c/cognitive_bias.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
89. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 323-24 (Kindle ed. 2011). The psy-
chologists Keith Stanovich and Richard West originally proposed the terms System 1 and System 
2. Id. 
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tion to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including com-
plex computations."90 Most biases result from System 1 processes.91 
Biases can be classified according to numerous standards, 92 but 
three main categories are more helpful for purposes of this Com-
ment: biases of understanding, persuasion, and decision-making. Bi-
ases of understanding involve seeing, witnessing, remembering, and 
investigating. Biases of persuasion affect problem solving and nego-
tiation. Biases of decision-making interfere with exercising judgment 
and using probability and statistics. The cognitive biases most rele-
vant to this Comment include the following: illusory correlation, 
bounded awareness, confirmation bias, framing effect, suggestibility, 
and cognitive dissonance.93 
3. The connection between informal fallacies and cognitive biases 
While informal fallacies and cognitive biases are related types of 
reasoning errors, it should be clear that they are different in kind. 
Any confusion that exists between the two likely results from the 
fact that reasoning is "a term that can refer to either a mental or a 
verbal activity."94 Reasoning, then, includes the mental process of 
creating a persuasive argument, the verbal act of reciting an argu-
ment, and the mental process of evaluating another person's argu-
ment.95 Informal fallacies describe written or verbalized arguments, 
while cognitive biases describe both the arguer and listener's mental 
processes. 
90. Id. at 327-30. 
91. Id. 
92. E.g., jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 645 (1999) (dividing cognitive biases into "those 
affecting the way in which individuals attempt to make 'scientific' and probabilistic judgments 
and those affecting the way in which individuals determine and exhibit their preferences"). 
93. I focus on these biases because they have the greatest influence on seeing, remember-
ing, understanding, and decision-making. 
94. Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative 
Theory, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 57, 59 (20ll) ("The mental action of working out a convincing 
argument, the public action of verbally producing this argument so that others will be convinced 
by it, and the mental action of evaluating and accepting the conclusion of an argument produced 
by others correspond to what is commonly and traditionally meant by reasoning."). 
95. Id. 
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Informal fallacies are descriptive labels for the types of argu-
ments that can be used to persuade jurors and witnesses, even 
though the arguments often lack a necessary premise or introduce 
irrelevant information. They are the type of argument that is highly 
persuasive and must be handled somewhat delicately since they can 
be misused to manipulate others. Cognitive biases are also descrip-
tive labels for processes that are both inborn in the individual and 
learned from social influences. Biases are what make the mind sus-
ceptible to persuasive, fallacious arguments, because the biases 
themselves act against reason-they lead people to reach incorrect 
conclusions that the "reasonable person" would never reach. 
To use a simple analogy, informal fallacies and cognitive biases 
are two sides of the same coin-one side that represents faulty ver-
bal or written reasoning, and one side that represents faulty mental 
reasoning. Informal fallacies generally describe the argument (rather 
than the arguer) and focus on the persuasiveness of the rhetoric, the 
relevance or clarity of the content, and the purpose or goal of the ar-
gument. Cognitive biases generally describe the faulty mental pro-
cesses of the observer, the arguer, and the listener, and focus on the 
way in which perceptions of the external object or argument are 
faulty and are easily influenced. Informal fallacies and cognitive bias-
es should therefore be understood in a new light specific to legal ar-
gumentation: Informal fallacies are persuasive tools that tend to induce 
errors in the way that other people process and think about infor-
mation, and they are used to manage what people perceive and even-
tually believe. 
C. Background and Context: Sophists, Philosophers, and Lawyers 
In fifth-century B.C. Athens, a class of teachers known as the 
Sophists became the center of attention with "their claim to teach 
'excellence' or 'virtue' ... both in mastering one's own affairs and in 
providing leadership in the city that makes them popular."96 The 
Sophists were teachers of rhetoric: the fundamentals and art of per-
suasive speaking, including how to present a case, marshal argu-
96. NORMAN MELCHERT, THE GREAT CONVERSATION: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
PHILOSOPHY 42 (5th ed. 2007). 
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ments, and appeal to the audience's emotions.97 Most relevant to the 
present topic was the Sophists' claim to teach "the ability to use the 
spoken word to persuade the jurors in the courts"98 and "how to 
make the weaker argument into the stronger."99 In short, the Soph-
ists were trained at manipulating other people's perceptions, or what 
I would call inducing errors in their thinking to manage what they 
perceive and eventually believe. 100 
But the Sophists also indoctrinated in their students the view of 
skepticism-that the individual can never get at truth, and thus the 
only reasonable response is to suspend judgment on all issues. 101 
They also taught their students to adopt a theory of relativism, 
which holds that truth102 "is relative to the individual, the culture, 
or the time." 103 
Philosophers have generally disagreed with the Sophists' ideas of 
skepticism and relativism because the philosopher's end goal is to 
reach ultimate truth. Unfortunately, because the art of rhetoric had 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 43. 
100. E.g., Childress, supra note 41. 
101. E.g., MELCHERT, supra note 96, at 43-45. 
102. "Truthiness," a word that was reinvigorated by the television personality Stephen 
Colbert, means "truth that comes from the gut, not books," and "the quality of preferring con-
cepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true." Word of the 
Year 2006, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/info/06words.htm (last visit-
ed Mar. 8, 2013). Colbert explained the word in an out-of-character interview: 
Truthiness is tearing apart our country, and I don't mean the argument over who 
came up with the word. I don't know whether it's a new thing, but it's certainly a cur-
rent thing, in that it doesn't seem to matter what facts are. It used to be, everyone 
was entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts. But that's not the case an-
ymore. Facts matter not at all. Perception is everything. It's certainty. People love the 
president because he's certain of his choices as a leader, even if the facts that back 
him up don't seem to exist. It's the fact that he's certain that is very appealing to a 
certain section of the country. I really feel a dichotomy in the American populace. 
What is important? What you want to be true, or what is true? 
.. Truthiness is "What I say is right, and [nothing] anyone else says could possibly 
be true." It's not only that I feel it to be true, but that I feel it to be true. There's 
not only an emotional quality, but there's a selfish quality. 
Nathan Rabin, Interview with Stephen Colbert, A.V. CLUB Oan. 25, 2006), 
http:/ /www.avclub.com/articles/stephen-colbert, 13970 (alteration in original). 
103. MELCHERT, supra note 96, at 45. 
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become so bound up with the Sophists' underlying beliefs, philoso-
phers have tended to reject rhetoric as a legitimate method to get at 
the truth. Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers began to develop 
well-reasoned and systematic tools for uncovering sophisms, or falla-
cious arguments that look good but are not. 104 Thus, philosophers 
were trained at recognizing the Sophists' manipulations and are the 
ones who labeled their rhetorical tactics "logical fallacies." While Ar-
istotle focused mostly on formal logic, he also recognized some in-
formal fallacies (such as fallacies of relevancy). Modern philosophers 
and logicians have greatly expanded upon Aristotle's foundational 
work and have developed a much broader understanding of informal 
fallacies. 105 
The lawyer's end goal is different than the Sophist's winning-at-
all-costs mentality, but it is also different than the philosopher's goal 
of discovering absolute truth. The lawyer cares a great deal about 
finding the truth, but he also cares about winning his client's case. 
As such, he uses language, reason, and rhetorical tools aimed at per-
suading others to believe his position. Because the term fallacy often 
carries a pejorative connotation, the lawyer tends to disagree that le-
gal arguments-or at least her legal arguments-are ever logically fal-
lacious. This view likely stems from the notion that "[j] udicial sys-
tems are based on the hypothesis that there is an essential and 
inseparable link between justice and truth.'.I06 The lawyer's principal 
job is to ensure that her client receives justice by advocating her cli-
ent's view of the truth. Out of respect for justice and truth, the good 
lawyer knows that "deliberate misrepresentation based on fallacies 
or some other rhetorical trick that serves to divorce truth from jus-
tice is not acceptable or ethical." 107 
104. GARNER, supra note 2, at 832 ("[S]ophist ... today has primarily negative connotations 
in the sense 'one who makes use of fallacious arguments; a specious reasoner.' Formerly it was a 
respectable word meaning 'one who is distinguished for learning! a wise or learned man."'); 
MELCHERT, supra note 96, at 45. 
105. Rice, supra note 66, at 106 & n.12 ("The modern rules of logic have been forged from 
the more than 2,000 years of philosophical struggle to determine just what logic is and why it is 
so important."). For an excellent taxonomy of both formal and informal fallacies, see Taxonomy of 
the Logical Fallacies, supra note 61. 
106. ARON ETAL., supra note 1, § 1:13. 
107. !d. 
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Do lawyers who use informally fallacious arguments recognize 
that they are managing other people's perceptions? The short answer 
is yes. With few exceptions, lawyers are aware of their tactics and 
the intended effect of their arguments. But they are likely unaware 
that their own cognitive biases affect their ability to reason logically. 
They understand the principles of reasoning and logic-e.g., that a 
valid argument is one in which "it is impossible for the premises to 
be true and the conclusion false," that a sound argument is "a valid 
argument with true premises," and that a strong argument has true 
premises that would "make the conclusion highly probable." 108 But 
they also understand the power of persuasion through rhetoric, the 
cognitive processes of perception (or at least how to manage percep-
tions), the task of getting the listener to see things as they do, and 
the concept that while a valid, deductive (or a strong, inductive) ar-
gument is a necessary condition to prove the truth of a case, it is not 
a sufficient condition to persuade the listener to believe-let alone 
want to believe-that a lawyer's position in a case is just. In sum, the 
lawyer generally does not view an otherwise truthful argument ex-
pressed with emotive or loaded language as fallacious; he views it as 
persuasive advocacy. 
When we label rhetorical tools as informal fallacies, the person 
employing those tools generally will disagree or even take offense. 
This is because the label seems to imply that the person employing 
the rhetorical tool is illogical. Yet it seems more correct to say that 
we label these tools as informal fallacies because we fear that the au-
dience is illogical and will not recognize the rhetorical tool for what 
it is: a fersuasive device that effectively manages people's percep-
tions.10 The label thus seems to serve more as a warning to the au-
dience than as a slight to the speaker. After all, the speaker must be 
thinking quite logically if she knows how to manage other people's 
perceptions. It is helpful, then, to think of the lawyer's use of infor-
mal fallacies not as a product of her own illogical or faulty reason-
108. LAWHEAD, supra note 13, at 42. 
109. See Childress, supra note 40, § 83 ("According to Aristotle, enthymemes are 'the very 
body and substance of persuasion.' For rational people and critically thinking people, enthy-
memes are understandable. But all minds on jury panels are not totally rational; nor would we want them 
to be. Therefore, the enthymeme should NOT be used alone, but in conjunction with a strong 
personal ethos and with specific emotional appeals (pathos)." (emphasis added)). 
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ing, 110 but rather as an aid to manage other people's perceptions, 
getting them to see and believe that her client's version of the truth 
is aligned with justice. 
In the following material, Parts III and IV, I use concrete exam-
ples to illustrate how the lawyer's use of informal fallacies can in-
duce cognitive biases in the listener. 
III. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, WRONGFUL CONVICTION, AND THE 
COURTS 
In Section A, I briefly discuss the insights that cogmuve psy-
chologists and legal scholars have already brought to bear on eyewit-
ness-testimony research and note how my Comment contributes to 
the literature. In Section B, I detail the facts and court proceedings of 
two cases. I do this to show the limited tools available to judges-a 
few evidentiary rules and a due-process test-to exclude likely inac-
curate or unduly persuasive eyewitness testimony from being pre-
sented to the jury. I also analyze the current research in cognitive 
psychology to better illustrate how specific informal fallacies induce 
specific cognitive biases. 
A. Cognitive Psychologists and Legal Scholars on Eyewitness Testimony 
Alarmingly, " [ e ]yewitness error is the leading cause of wrongful 
convictions in the United States." 111 A recent review of the first 200 
DNA-exoneration cases found that eyewitness misidentification was 
involved in 158 of the cases (or 79%). 112 How do cognitive biases 
and informal fallacies influence eyewitness testimony that leads to 
wrongful convictions? 
Numerous scholars have already addressed the role of cognitive 
bias in the wrongful-conviction context. Some have focused on pros-
ecutors' susceptibility to certain biases affecting the way they inves-
110. See Dowden, supra note 61 ("1n describing the fallacies ... it would be more accu-
rate to say that a reasoner commits the fallacy and the reasoning contains the fallacy."). 
111. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 33, § 1-2; A viva Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with 
Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 440 (2011) 
("Mistaken eyewitness testimony is a large contributing factor to wrongful convictions[.]"). 
112. Brandon L. Garrett, judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78 (2008). 
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tigate, prosecute, and eventually convict the innocent. 113 Others 
have proposed prosecutorial best-practice strategies, 114 have sug-
gested the need for greater clarity in the standards governing attor-
ney-witnesses pretrial communications, 115 or have confronted the 
issue of "prosecutorial denial of DNA exoneration.',! 16 These highly 
informative lines of research focus on the lawyer's cognitive biases 
that influence his own reasoning. As noted earlier in the section on 
persuasion, 117 an individual certainly can persuade himself to believe 
something, which is very similar to the effect of cognitive bias chang-
ing one's own belief. 
Eyewitness-testimony errors are not always caused by the eye-
witness being blatantly wrong or actively trying to deceive the court. 
Much of the error is attributable to investigators and lawyers who 
attempt to manage the eyewitness's perceptions in preparation for 
113. Susan Ban des, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 How. L.]. 
475, 481 & n.48, 493 (2006) (explaining that tunnel vision, which "results in the officer becom-
ing so focused upon an individual or incident that no other person or incident registers in the 
officer's thoughts," involves a "complex mix of psychological, social, and moral factors"); Alafair 
Burke, Commentary: Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 575, 580 (2007) (arguing that the Brady doctrine "invites cognitive biases," such as con-
firmation bias and selective information processing, that will consistently "cause prosecutors to 
undervalue materiality"). Compare Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some 
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2006) (explaining that prose-
cutors are irrational, human decision-makers, subject to "a common set of information-
processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality"), with Fred Klein, A View from Inside 
the Ropes: A Prosecutor's Viewpoint on Disclosing Exculpatory Evidence, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 867, 876 
(2010) ("Once the prosecution has decided in its own mind that the defendant is guilty, the goal 
becomes one of marshalling the evidence to ensure conviction and avoiding or minimizing any 
other evidence that gets in the way."). 
114. Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. ].L. & 
LIBERTY 512, 520-21 (2007) (suggesting several "prosecutor-initiated reforms," or "debiasing 
strategies," aimed at mitigating the effects of cognitive bias). 
115. Melanie D. Wilson, Quieting Cognitive Bias with Standards for Witness Communications, 
62 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1229 (2011) (detailing several proposed changes to the ABA Criminal 
Justice Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions and explaining "why carefully tailored 
Standards may lessen the detrimental impact" of cognitive biases on pretrial communications 
with witnesses). 
116. Orenstein, supra note 111, at 446 (examining the various explanations, including cog-
nitive biases and denial, for why prosecutors "resist obviously true claims of innocence," id. at 
419-24); see also Bandes, supra note 113, at 475 (noting as a "disturbing theme ... the refusal 
of prosecutors to concede that the wrong person was convicted, even after a defendant's exoner-
ation"). 
117. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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trial (and even during the trial)Y 8 This sort of preparation for trial 
is usually done out of a good-faith desire to make sure the witness's 
testimony is helpful rather than harmful at trial. But the lawyer's 
own cognitive bias may tend to convince him that his "'preparation' 
of a witness will foster the witness's ability to tell a story effectively 
rather than influence the witness to deviate from her own version in 
ways that advance the interests of the lawyer's client." 119 Thus, the 
persuasive lawyer will try to induce his witness "to behave in a pre-
dictable manner, to respond to persuasion by doing what the [law-
yer] wants him to when he wants it done, and to respond willingly 
and agreeably." 120 
B. Courts' Limited Role in Excluding Unreliable Testimony 
1. Excluding opinion that lacks a rational connection to actual perception 
Courts seem to recognize (to a certain extent) the undue power 
that a witness's faulty perceptions can have over the witness's opin-
ion testimony. This is demonstrated by certain federal and state rules 
of evidence that act as safeguards by excluding opinions that lack a 
rational connection to the witness's actual perception. 121 
During a traffic stop for speeding, two Maryland state troopers 
arrested Kenneth Robinson after discovering there was a warrant out 
for his arrest for parole violation. 122 Upon searching Robinson, one 
trooper found a transparent baggie with eight rocks inside, which he 
believed was crack cocaine. 123 Back at the station, Robinson attacked 
the troopers and managed to swallow the baggie of eight rocks. Rob-
inson received treatment at a hospital, but "[n]either the mcks nor 
the baggie were ever recovered" and thus were not chemically ana-
118. See supra Part Il.A.1 (explaining system variables as factors that are manipulable in 
actual legal proceedings). 
119. Wilson, supra note 115, at 1229. 
120. BAKER & PHIFER, supra note 24, at 124. 
121. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 701 (stating that "[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, tes-
timony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is ... rationally based on the witness's 
perception" (emphasis added)). 
122. Robinson v. State, 702 A.2d 741, 742-43 (Md. 1997). 
123. Id. at 743. 
343 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
lyzed. 124 A jury convicted Robinson of possession of cocaine based 
on the lay opinion testimonies of the two troopers who handled the 
baggie, neither of whom were "expert in narcotic identification." 
One trooper testified that he got a "good look" at the rocks in the 
baggie and the other trooper that he "could see the eight pieces 
clearly." 125 "[B]ased on their training and experience, the troopers 
drew the common sense inference that the substance swallowed by 
Robinson looked like crack cocaine. The troopers further concluded 
that the substance was, in fact, crack cocaine." 126 
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the state 
troopers' opinion testimony lacked a sufficient "rational connection 
between what the troopers actually perceived and the ultimate opin-
ions they expressed at trial." 127 The court declared that the proper 
test to ensure that a "sufficiently rational nexus exists between actu-
al perception and the subsequent lay opinion testimony based on 
that perception is the validity of the proposition the witness used to 
link perception to opinion." 128 That the rocks had the mere visual 
appearance of crack cocaine did not make it reasonably certain that 
they were in fact crack cocaine. At the time the case was decided, it 
was extremely common for drug dealers to sell counterfeit substanc-
es that had the same visual resemblance of controlled substances. 
Thus, it was equally likely that the troopers had perceived a look-
alike substance as it was that they had perceived actual crack co-
caine. "Hence, the proposition that crack cocaine can be identified by 
sight alone with reasonable certainty by a lay witness is logically un-
sound."129 
2. Excluding unreliable identifications due to suggestive circumstances 
More than forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
the inherent "problems of eyewitness identification" 130 and decided 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 751. 
127. Id. at 750. 
128. Id. at 751. 
129. Id. at 752. 
130. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-12 (1977) (construing Stovall v. Denno, 388 
344 
319 Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation 
to increase the available "protections against mistaken eyewitness 
testimony." 131 The Court noted that the admission of highly 
unreliable identification testimony could violate a criminal 
defendant's due-process guarantee to a fair trial. 132 Between 1967 
and 1977, the Court decided a number of cases creating a guiding 
test-the Biggers analysis-to determine whether preliminary judicial 
review is required when defendants claim that "an eyewitness 
identification was made under such suggestive circumstances that 
due process requires its exclusion from evidence." 133 Most 
significant was the Court's holding in Manson v. Braithwaite that 
reliability-i.e. probable accuracy-"is the linchpin in determining 
the admissibility of identification testimony." 134 The Biggers analysis, 
then, was aimed at preventing false identifications from convicting 
innocent persons. 
Last term, the Supreme Court applied a "retroactive revision of 
its existing eyewitness identification cases" 135 when it held that 
U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967)). Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun explained "the driving force" behind these cas· 
es: 
Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under cir-
cumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The witness' recollection of the 
stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the police. 
Thus, Wade and its companion cases reflect the concern that the jury not hear eyewit-
ness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability. 
Id. at 112. 
131. I d. at 118 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
132. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 ("(R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the ad-
missibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall confrontations. The factors 
to be considered . . . . include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time 
of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the crimi-
nal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime 
and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the sugges-
tive identification itself."); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301~02 
(recognizing the right to claim that a "confrontation conducted ... was so unnecessarily sug-
gestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due 
process of law"); Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263; Wade, 388 U.S. 218. 
133. Brief for American Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Petitioner at 
5, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-8974) [hereinafter APA Amicus 
Brief] (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; Biggers, 409 U.S. 188; Stovall, 388 U.S. 293). 
134. Id. at 5 (quoting Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114). 
135. Note, Fifth Amendment-Suggestive Eyewitness Identifications: Perry v. New Hampshire, 126 
HARV. L. REv. 246, 256 (2012) [hereinafter Suggestive Eyewitness Identifications]. 
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these same due-process safeguards do not protect against eyewit-
ness-identification evidence obtained in impermissibly suggestive 
circumstances, likely to lead to misidentification. Likely unreliable 
eyewitness testimony procured under suggestive circumstances does 
not require a preliminary judicial review unless improper state action 
created the suggestive circumstances. 136 
On August 15, 2008, at just before 3:00 a.m., Nashua police of-
ficer Nicole Clay arrived at the parking lot of a large apartment build-
ing after receiving a report "about a black male looking through ve-
hicles and attempting to gain entry." 137 Nubia Blandon, who speaks 
only Spanish, had her husband telephone the police when she ob-
served from her apartment window a black man removing items 
from the Honda Civic belonging to her neighbor-across-the-hall, 
Alex Clavijo. 138 At some point, Blandon left her apartment to alert 
Clavijo his car had been broken into. Upon her arrival to the scene, 
Officer Clay saw Barion Perry, the petitioner, standing between two 
cars and holding amplifiers. She asked Perry to put down the ampli-
fiers and to come over and speak to her, which he did. Perry told 
Clay he had found the amplifiers sitting on the ground and he was 
just then moving them. He also told Clay two other men had left the 
parking lot before Clay arrived. After Perry pointed out one of the 
men nearby, "Clay questioned this other man briefly before letting 
him go." 139 
Clavijo had descended from his apartment and approached Clay 
just as she was finishing up with the man that Perry had pointed 
out. 14° Clavijo identified himself as the owner of the Civic and said 
that his neighbor, Nubia Blandon, was the only person claiming to 
have witnessed the break-in. 141 Just then, Officer Robert Dunn ar-
rived at the scene and Clay asked Dunn to stand with Perry while 
Clay went with Clavijo into the apartment building to speak to Blan-
136. Brief for Petitioner at i, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-
8974). 
137. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974). 
138. Id. at 2-3. 
139. Id. at 3. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 2-3. 
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don. 142 Clay left the two men standing in the middle of the parking 
lot. just like Clay, "Dunn was in full uniform," and both officers 
"had arrived in fully-marked police cruisers." 143 Tellingly, as he 
stood alone with Dunn, "Perry was the only black man in the ar-
ea."l44 
Up on the "second or third floor," Clavijo translated as Clay 
questioned Blandon in the hallway outside Blandon's apartment. 145 
Clay could not see Dunn and Perry from where she spoke with Blan-
don. When Clay asked Blandon for a description of the man she had 
seen, Blandon could only describe him as a tall black man. Clay 
sought additional details but Blandon did not give any "details as to 
the suspect's facial features, clothing, facial hair, or any other identi-
fying characteristics." 146 While Clay never asked Blandon to identify 
Perry, when Clay asked for a better description of the man, Blandon 
pointed back toward the window in her apartment "to show that she 
had already looked," and told Clay that "it was the man that was in 
the back parking lot standing with the police officer." 147 Clay did not 
take Blandon and point out Perry, and Clay failed to ask Blandon 
whether Blandon "had continually watched the man from the time of 
the theft to the time the police arrived or if she had left the window 
at any point." 148 Based on Blandon's eyewitness account, Officer 
Clay arrested Perry that same night. 149 
On September 21, thirty-seven days later, Blandon went to the 
police station and was shown "a photo array including a photo of 
Perry, but she could neither pick out any person as the man she saw 
in the lot nor provide a descri€tion because 'she did not clearly per-
ceive the details of his face.".! 0 Perry motioned to suppress the evi-
dence that Blandon had identified Perry to Clay because its admis-
sion would violate his due process right to a fair trial. The trial court 




146. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 4. 
147. !d. 
148. !d. 
149. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 137, at 8. 
ISO. !d. 
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denied the motion because there were no unnecessarily suggestive 
police procedures that created the identification. 151 
At trial, Blandon never made an in-court identification of Perry 
as the perpetrator. In fact, when an attorney at trial asked whether 
she had been able to point out the man she had seen removing 
something from Clavijo's car, Blandon replied, "Not point, as I said 
thank God the officer arrived in time and found out who the person 
was." 152 The jury convicted Perry of theft by unauthorized taking, 
the trial court sentenced him to three to ten years in prison, and Per-
ry appealed. 153 The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed with 
the U.S. Supreme Court that reliability alone is the linchpin of ad-
missibility. Instead, the court concluded that government-created 
suggestiveness is the proper prerequisite for a judge to even question 
the admissibility of an eyewitness identification. 154 
The court also rejected Perry's due-process claim and held that 
"the Biggers analysis does not apply to a potentially suggestive out-of-
court identification where there is a complete absence of improper 
state action." 155 Perry petitioned for certiorari, and in january 2012 
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the state court's position. 156 The 
Court held that, unless "improper law enforcement activity is in-
volved," eyewitness reliability is tested through the other rights 
available to defendants, such as "the presence of counsel at 
postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules 
of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." 157 
As noted earlier in the section on perception, 158 extensive esti-
mator-variable research shows that "the presence or absence of state 
action in creating any suggestiveness is frequently irrelevant to 'the 
primary evil to be avoided,' i.e., the 'likelihood of ... misidentifica-
151. Brieffor Petitioner, supra note 136, at 6. 
152. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 137, at 8. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 6. 
155. State v. Addison, 8 A.3d 118, 126 (N.H. 2010). 
156. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). 
157. !d. at 721. 
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tion.".I 59 The American Psychological Association has argued that 
the requirement of improper state action "derogates the focus on ac-
curacy that lies at the core of [the] Court's relevant precedent," as 
there is an equally high risk of wrongful convictions resulting from 
false identifications where no state-created suggestiveness is in-
volved. 160 
IV. CONNECTING THE LINKS BETWEEN SPECIFIC INFORMAL 
FALLACIES AND SPECIFIC COGNITIVE BIASES 
A. Fallacy of Irrelevant Thesis and Bounded Awareness 
In short, the new Biggers analysis seems to commit the fallacy of 
irrelevant thesis. The fallacy of irrelevant thesis, 161 similar to the red 
herring, 162 is an argument that distracts from the main issue at hand. 
It involves marshaling evidence to support an irrelevant conclusion 
that is different from the real issue, and it is psychologically persua-
sive because generally it differs only subtly. 163 The difficult part of 
asserting that an argument commits the fallacy of irrelevance is in 
establishing what the "real" issue is. 
158. See supra Part II.A.l. 
159. APA Amicus Brief, supra note 133, at 3 (emphasis added) (quoting Neil v. Big-
gers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)). 
160. /d. at 6. 
161. ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 638 ("[The fallacy of irrelevance] is made by attempting to 
prove something that has not even been denied or by attacking something that has not been as-
serted. . . . In a murder trial, for example, a prosecutor is guilty of the fallacy of irrelevance if, 
instead of proving the defendant guilty of murder, he proves him to be guilty of other crimes."). 
162. Red Herring, FALLACY FILES, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/redherrf.html (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2013) ("The name of [the red herring] fallacy comes from the sport of fox hunting in 
which a dried, smoked herring, which is red in color, is dragged across the trail of the fox to 
throw the hounds off the scent. Thus, a 'red herring' argument ... distracts the audience from 
the issue in question through the introduction of some irrelevancy."). Red herrings show up 
frequently, particular in politics. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Santorum's New Cause: Opposing the Disa-
bled, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/santorums-new-cause-
opposing-the-disabled/20 12/ II /26/9ab0605a-3829-ll e2-b01 f-5f55b 193f58f_story.html ("But the opposi-
tion is significant, because it shows the ravages of the Senate's own disability: If members can't 
even agree to move forward on an innocuous treaty to protect the disabled, how are they to 
agree on something as charged as the "'fiscal cliff?'"). 
163. ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 638 ("The fallacy of irrelevance can be most deceptive, for 
the presentation may seem very cogent, obscuring the fact that a question different from the one 
under consideration is being discussed."). 
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Even though its precedent decisions make clear that the real is-
sue is reliability-ensuring that a criminal defendant receives a fair 
trial by excluding highly unreliable identifications-the Perry Court 
backs away from its earlier position: "Our decisions ... turn on the 
presence of state action and aim to deter police from rigging identifi-
cation ~rocedures, for example, at a lineup, showup, or photograph 
array." 64 "By disowning reliability as an independent due process 
concern in past eyewitness identification cases," 165 the Court had to 
abrogate First, Second, and Sixth Circuit precedents that all followed 
the original Biggers analysis. 166 
The "real" issue has now shifted toward deterring improper po-
lice misconduct that leads to inaccurate identifications. 167 It follows, 
the Court reasons, that when there is no police misconduct, "the 
proper remedy for any alleged suggestiveness" must be "cross exam-
ination and argument." 168 Ironically, the new Biggers analysis, which 
was a due-process rule aimed at preventing likely unreliable eyewit-
ness identifications from persuading jurors, has transformed into a 
rule that permits likely unreliable identifications. 169 This is because 
the Court's reasoning commits the fallacy of irrelevant thesis. 
164. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012). 
165. Suggestive Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 135, at 250-51. 
166. Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated by Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 
723 n.4; United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506 (1st Cir. 1989), abrogated by Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 
723 n.4; Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723 n.4. 
The First Circuit had clarified quite succinctly the "real" issue of the original Biggers analysis: 
Because the due process focus in the identification context is on the fairness of the 
trial and not exclusively on police deterrence, it follows that federal courts should 
scrutinize all suggestive identification procedures, not just those orchestrated by the 
police, to determine if they would sufficiently taint the trial so as to deprive the de-
fendant of due process. 
Bouthot, 878 F.2d at 1516. 
167. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720-21 ("We have not extended pretrial screening for reliabil-
ity to cases in which the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement offic-
ers."); State v. Addison, 8 A. 3d 118, 126 (N.H. 2010) ("The majority of federal and state courts 
agree that an allegedly suggestive pre-trial identification must be the result of state action in 
order to affect the admissibility of a later in-court identification."). 
168. Addison, 8 A.3d at 126 (quoting State v. King, 934 A.2d 556, 561 (N.H. 2007)). 
169. Due process is a guarantee to the individual standing trial that all aspects of the trial 
will be fair. While generally acting as a safeguard against state misconduct, due process is not 
limited to preventing only unfairness created by actors on the state's payroll. While it is true 
that false identifications can and do result from state-created suggestiveness, it is false that false 
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Related to the fallacy of irrelevance is the cognitive bias called 
bounded awareness, "the phenomenon where individuals fail to see, 
seek, use, or share highly relevant, easily accessible, and readil6 per-
ceivable information during the decision-making process." 17 The 
human mind can focus on only a fraction of everyday experience be-
cause of its limited cognitive power to multitask. 171 Despite feeling 
otherwise, "we are not as good at multitasking as we'd like to be-
lieve."172 
Again, the real issue in the Biggers analysis may differ very subtly 
from what the state court and the Supreme Court acknowledged. Be-
cause state supreme courts have very busy dockets, it seems fair to 
say that they do a lot of multitasking. It is also very reasonable to 
consider that the court experiences bounded awareness during the 
decision-making process. There is only so much information the 
court can consider before it is bound to miss information that is rel-
evant, accessible, and perceivable. The fact that the state court issued 
only a short memorandum opinion, which relied almost entirely on a 
separate case it had recently decided, may be slight evidence that the 
court is multitasking. The court's bounded awareness-its failure to 
see and use the readily perceivable and highly relevant psychological 
research showing that state-created suggestiveness is irrelevant to 
the issue of reliability-was likely the faulty reasoning process be-
hind the new Biggers rule, which also seems to commit the fallacy of 
irrelevant thesis. 
In addition, the court's new rule incorrectly allowed Nubia Blan-
don's highly unreliable, out-of-court identification testimony to con-
vict Barion Perry. Contrary to the court's claim that there was no 
state-created suggestiveness, Blandon's testimony at trial that she 
never pointed out Perry but relied on the police arriving in time to 
identifications result only from state-created suggestiveness. False identifications can and do 
occur without any improper state conduct at all, or even without any suggestiveness. See APA 
Amicus Brief, supra note 133, at 13 ("Conversely, eyewitness testimony can be reliable even 
when suggestiveness (state-created or otherwise) does exist, for example, when other factors 
reinforce the accuracy of an identification made in circumstances that otherwise would be ques-
tionable."). 
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find out who the man was, is evidence that the suggestive circum-
stances were roughly the same as an unofficial showup. Showups 
that occur with a suspect in police custody, whether handcuffed, in a 
police cruiser, or merely standing with a police officer, can create 
even more incorrect eyewitness identifications, "not because of 
recognition, but because of witness deduction ('Gee, this must be 
the criminal because the police have him in handcuffs.')." 173 Bound-
ed awareness explains Blandon's inability to identify Perry as the 
man who broke into Clavijo's car. Bounded awareness also explains 
the trial judge's inexplicable statement: "The fact that Mr. Perry was 
standing in the parking lot with Officer Dunn was coincidental." 174 
B. Fallacy of Exclusion and Confirmation Bias 
One commits the fallacy of exclusion if her argument excludes un-
dermining counterevidence or her premises come from a biased se-
lection of the available evidence. 175 An example of the fallacy of ex-
clusion is the testimony of the state troopers in Robinson v. State. 176 
Based on their long years of experience as state troopers, including 
many encounters with crack cocaine, the troopers testified that the 
eight rocks found in the baggie, which Robinson later swallowed, 
were in fact crack cocaine. 177 Because the prosecution had no other 
evidence to prove that the substance Robinson ingested actually was 
crack cocaine, the troopers' opinion testimony was essential to the 
case. That the appellate court-an institution far more removed from 
encounters with street drugs than the troopers-focused its opinion 
on the prevalence of synthetic, lookalike drugs suggests that the 
troopers (or at least the prosecutors) very likely knew about the 
prevalence of such counterfeit drugs. 178 Yet the troopers (under-
standably) never mentioned the lookalike drugs; it was a fact that di-
173. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 32, § 4-7, at 92. 
174. Joint Appendix at *86a, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. I0-
8974). 
175. Stephen Downes, Fallacy of Exclusion, STEPHEN'S GUIDE TO LOGICAL FALLACIES (May 26, 
1995), http:/ /onegoodmove.org/fallacy/exclus.htm. 
176. Robinson v. State, 702 A.2d 741 (Md. 1997); see supra Part IV.A. 
177. Robinson, 702 A.2d at 751. 
178. Id. at 750. 
352 
319 Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation 
rectly undermined the persuasiveness of their testimonies. Is there 
an alternate explanation for why the troopers might have withheld, 
or at least discounted as unimportant, the undermining fact about 
the prevalence of lookalike drugs? 
After conducting extensive research in cognitive psychology, Dan 
Sperber and Dr. Hugo Mercier came to a profound conclusion: Most 
people are not as interested in "finding the truth as much as they are 
hell bent upon justifying their own views and thoughts." 179 People 
will often refuse even to consider opposing views, "no matter how 
weighty and convincing they may be." 180 This tendency to cling to 
our own beliefs-looking to evidence that supports while rejecting 
evidence that contradicts those beliefs 181-is known as confirmation 
bias. 182 Confirmation bias helps to explain why people ignore the 
scientific method's basic rule of "testing hypotheses by trying to re-
fute them": people "seek data that are likely to be compatible with 
the beliefs they currently hold." 183 
Confirmation bias also describes the tendency for our expecta-
tions to affect our perceptions and the tendency to base conclusions 
on preexisting ideas instead of actual facts. While sometimes ex-
plained by fervent ideological or religious beliefs, the motivation to 
avoid disconfirming evidence may be explained by a desire to remain 
consistent-fulfilling the need for personal adequacy. 184 When a 
person abandons a publicly announced view, she might lose the es-
teem of others; but when she abandons a privately held view, she 
risks lowering her own self-esteem. 185 Thus, while the legal system 
is concerned with finding the truth, "people are often motivated to 
179. AQ Khan, Mentality, Self-Deception and Psychology, NEWS 1NT'L (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www. thenews.com. pk(f odaysPrin tDetail.aspx? lD = 80840&Cat = 9. 
180. Id. 
181. Metzger, supra note 18, at 477 (stating that "evidence indicates that we are also 
strongly predisposed against seeking out information that would contradict our beliefs" and that 
"we are strongly motivated to search out information that confirms our beliefs"). 
182. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 14, at 2 78; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning and Scien-
tific Reasoning, 63 ALA. L. REV. 895, 904 (2012) ("Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek, be-
lieve, and remember information that agrees with what we already think."). 
183. KAHNEMAN, supra note 89, at 1417-18. 
184. Id. at 280. 
185. Id. 
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be far less critical of facts and ar~uments that support their preferred 
result than an unpreferred one." 86 
Let's return to the state troopers. The troopers' susceptibility to 
confirmation bias-or "tunnel vision"187 -might account for them 
committing the fallacy of exclusion in their trial by omitting details 
about the synthetic, lookalike drugs. The troopers first formed an 
opinion that the rocks were crack cocaine based on their past experi-
ence of searching people and finding cocaine packaged in similar 
transparent baggies. The troopers opinion was further confirmed 
when Robinson attacked them at the station and swallowed the bag-
gie. Since Robinson was in violation of parole, getting caught with 
illegal drugs likely meant he would be headed back to jail. To avoid 
the inevitable, Robinson found a way to get rid of the evidence. Fur-
thermore, the troopers had no reason to believe that Robinson had 
ingested a lookalike drug once it was evident that Robinson required 
serious medical attention. Thus, the state troopers' perceptions con-
firmed their pre-existing biases, and they testified according to the 
truth and justice as they saw it. But their good-faith testimony was 
ruled to be unduly persuasive since it lacked a rational connection to 
their actual perceptions. 
C. Fallacy of Style over Substance and the Framing Effect 
Not only is the individual affected by the strength of the evidence 
but also the way the evidence is presented. A recent study measuring 
the accuracy with which people make probability judgments found 
that when separate pieces of evidence are presented one at a time, 
rather than all at once, the evidence is perceived to be stronger. 188 
Participants were shown on a computer screen two large lakes, each 
containing four colors of fish in varying proportions, and both lakes 
flowed into a single pond below. First, three fish were shown in the 
186. ld. 
187. Ellsworth, supra note 182, at 906 (explaining that "tunnel vision" is a form of "con-
firmation bias, in this case confirmation of the guilt of an initial suspect, [and] may be an im-
portant contribution to false convictions"); see also sources cited supra note 113. 
188. Nicole Jardine, How People Are Fooled by Evidence: The 'One at a Time' Effect Changes How 
Facts Are Interpreted, Sci. AM. (Nov. 22, 2011), http:/ /www.scientificamerican.com/article 
.cfm? id =how-people-are-fooled-by-evidence. 
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pond below, and then the lakes above were populated with the dif-
ferent colored fish, either all at once or sequentially, one color of fish 
at a time (e.g., first the yellow fish, then the white fish, then the 
black fish, then the red fish). Participants then rated the probability 
that the three fish came from one upstream lake, Lake A, rather than 
the other upstream lake, Lake B. When researchers added the fish 
gradually to one lake, participants concluded that the evidence was 
stronger that the fish came from that upstream lake rather than the 
other. 189 
This study is a perfect example of using the informal fallacy of 
style over substance to play upon the cognitive bias known as the 
framing effect. Style over substance occurs when the arguer's style of 
presenting her argument is perceived to add to the strength or sub-
stance of the argument. 190 And the framing effect happens when peo-
ple can draw different conclusions from identical information based 
solely on how the information is presented. 191 Thus, the prosecutor 
who in closing arguments recounts five pieces of damning evidence 
in quick succession will be perceived as having a weaker argument 
than the defense attorney who methodically describes, one at a time, 
three pieces of exculpatory evidence. 
D. Fallacy of Emotive or Loaded Language and Suggestibility 
The wording of questions asked an eyewitness has a pervasive in-
fluence on the answer given. 192 The informal fallacy of loaded language 
is "emotive terminology that expresses value judgments."193 When 
used in what might appear to be an objective statement, loaded Ian-
189. jennifer C. Whitman & Todd S. Woodward, Evidence Affects Hypothesis judgments More if 
Accumulated Gradually than if Presented Instantaneously, 18 PSYCHO NOMIC BULL. & REV. 1156, 1162-
63 (20 11), available at http:/ /www.springerlink.com/content/0587663184524111/fulltext.pdf. 
190. Dowden, supra note 61. 
191. Steven Bradley, The Framing Effect: Influence Your Audience by Setting the Context, 
VANBLOG Qune 7, 2010), http:/ /www.vanseodesign.com/web-design/framing-expectation-
exposure-effect. 
192. LoFTUS ET AL., supra note 33, § 3-11 (a), at 70-71. 
193. Dowden, supra note 61; Loaded Words, FALLACY FILES, http://www.fallacyfiles.org 
/loadword.html ("A word or phrase is 'loaded' when it has a secondary, evaluative meaning in 
addition to its primary, descriptive meaning. When language is 'loaded,' it is loaded with its 
evaluative meaning. A loaded word is like a loaded gun, and its evaluative meaning is the bul-
let."). 
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guage "can cause the listener to adopt those values when in fact no 
good reason has been given for doing so." 194 In one of her well-
known studies, Elizabeth Loftus showed participants films of car ac-
cidents and then asked them a question, with the goal of substitut-
ing one word in the question to see whether it would affect qualita-
tive judgments-in this case, judgments about the relative speed of 
the cars. 195 The base question was, "About how fast were the cars 
going when they hit each other?" 196 Other participants were asked 
the same questions except the verb hit was replaced with "contact-
ed," "bumped," "collided," and "smashed."197 The difference in the 
verbs was "in what they imply about speed and force of impact." 198 
Those asked about "smashed" gave the highest speed estimates 
(40.8 mph), while those asked about "contacted" gave the lowest 
speed estimates (30.8 mph). The legal system's recognition of these 
nuanced differences in the wording of questions developed through 
rules for the permissible use of "leading questions." 199 
The cognitive bias of suggestibility is a "close cousin of misattribu-
tion," where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for one's 
own memory.200 After researchers showed a group of volunteers the 
first episode of the television show, "24," the volunteers either 
played a game or took an immediate recall test about the episode. 
Both groups were then told false information about the show they 
had watched and then took a final memory test about the episode. 
Interestingly, the group who took a recall test immediately after they 
watched the show were "almost twice as likely to recall false infor-
mation compared to the volunteers who played the game following 
the episode."201 The results suggested that the first recall test actual-
194. Dowden, supra note 61. 
195. LOFTUS, supra note 19, at 96-97. 
196. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
197. Id. 
198. !d. 
199. Id. at 97. 
200. Jeremy Dean, When Suggestibility Is a Liability: Wrongful Convictions, PsYBLOG (Feb. 19, 
2008), http:/ /www.spring.org. uk/2008/02/when-suggestibility-is-liability. php. 
201. Did I See What I Think I Saw?, Scr. DAILY Oan. 30, 2009), http:/ /www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2009 /01/09012816083 5. htm. 
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ly "enhanced learning of new and erroneous information," showing 
that "recently recalled information is prone to distortion."202 
When an investigator uses loaded language to question an eye-
witness immediately after an event, the cognitive bias of suggestibil-
ity makes the eyewitness's account prone to distortion. This is par-
ticularly true after a highly traumatic event because the eyewitness's 
emotional levels are already aroused. Investigators may feel they are 
attempting to help the eyewitness to recall the event; the truth is that 
the investigator is helping the eyewitness to reconstruct the event. 
The formal rules that guard against leading questions in the court 
room cannot prevent an interviewer on the scene from inadvertently 
changing the witness's memory. 
E. Poisoning the Well, the Straw Man, and Cognitive Dissonance 
The informal fallacy of poisoning the well is an attempt to prevent 
disagreement by negatively characterizing people who disagree and 
positively characterizing people who agree with the speaker's posi-
tion.203 For example, a prosecutor poisons the well when he says: 
"When is the defense attorney planning to call that twice-convicted 
child molester, David Barnington, to the stand? OK, I'll rephrase 
that. When is the defense attorney planning to call David Barnington 
to the stand?"204 A juror who then becomes unreceptive to Mr. Bam-
ington's testimony has become "a victim of the poisoner."205 Legal 
arguments may also poison the well against a position. For instance, 
in an 18 72 debate over a bill to require that schools be desegregated, 
Senator Eli Saulsbury of Delaware said it was "treason to the white 
race" to support the bill. Any senator who then supported the bill 
risked drinking from the poisoned well and bearing the title of a trai-
tor. 
202. Id. 
203. Poisoning the Well, FALLACY FILES, http:/ /www.fallacyfiles.org/poiswell.html (last visit-
ed Feb. II, 2013) ("The phrase 'poisoning the well' ultimately alludes to the medieval European 
myth that the black plague was caused by Jews poisoning town wells-a myth which was used as 
an excuse to persecute Jews."). 
204. Dowden, supra note 61. 
205. Id. 
357 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
Another informal fallacy that often complements a well poison-
ing is the straw man-a fallacious argument that handily defeats an 
opposing viewpoint by hastily dismantling and reassembling an over-
ly simplified or distorted version of it.206 Turning back to the exam-
ple of a man's family who sues the helicopter manufacturer after the 
man died in a helicopter crash,207 the defense attorney's closing ar-
gument would contain a straw man if she argued the following: 
Plaintiffs have argued that my client-a company made up of highly 
skilled engineers who always triple- and quadruple-check every 
component on each helicopter before they are satisfied it is safe to 
sell-killed their dad; that their dad would be alive had my client 
never manufactured the helicopter that the pilot allowed to crash. 
But think about it. That's like saying, "Remington killed my dad, 
because he would still be alive had Remington never manufactured 
the rifle that my dad's hunting buddy allowed to go off." 
A couple of things go wrong with this argument. Besides con-
taining a false analogy, 208 the argument sets up a stilted re-creation of 
the opposing argument-just as a "straw man" is a re-creation of a 
real man-and easily defeats the argument, or knocks it down.209 
The cognitive bias most related to these informal fallacies is cog-
nitive dissonance210-a state of psychological discomfort that occurs 
when a person holds two inconsistent cognitions at the same 
time. 211 Cognitions include "knowledge, opinions, beliefs, values, 
206. Straw Man, FALLACY FILES, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/strawman.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2013) ("A straw man argument occurs in the context of a debate ... when one side 
attacks a position-the 'straw man'-not held by the other side, then acts as though the other 
side's position has been refuted."). 
207. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
208. False Analogy, CHANGINGMINDS.ORG, 
http:/ /changingminds.org/disciplines/argument/fallacies/false _ analogy.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013) ("Analogy is saying 'A is like B' and is a powerful way of explaining one thing in terms of 
another. Where it falls down is when A is assumed to be like B in all respects and any attribute 
or characteristic of B can be unequivocally attributed to A."). 
209. E.g., Bryan A. Garner, What's an Error in Language?, ABA]., Dec. 2012, at 20 ("Before I 
discourse more on that tricky point, let me dispel the idea that I set up and knock down straw 
men (even the most gender-neutral writer can't insist on straw people)."). 
210. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
211. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 14, at 366; Simon, supra note 10, at 46-47 ("Festinger 
explained that dissonance is aroused by the fact that choosing between competing alternative 
courses of action entails endorsing some unattractive attributes and foregoing [sic] some attrac-
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and awareness of" one's actions.212 There are three strategies a per-
son may use to reduce the feeling of dissonance: (I) discount the 
importance of conflicting cognitions to maintain the status quo, (2) 
add new cognitions that justify the behavior or belief, (3) or change 
the behavior or belief.21 For example, a juror presented with con-
flicting theories of a case experiences cognitive dissonance and must 
resolve the inconsistency through one of these strategies to decide 
which theory is correct. While dissonance always occurs in the deci-
sion-making process, dissonance involving self-conception, such as 
feelin~s of foolishness or immorality, is a particularly powerful moti-
vator. 14 The greater the importance or i~act of a decision, the 
greater the dissonance one will experience. 21 
The persuasive lawyer knows that "[c]ognitive dissonance is cen-
tral to many forms of persuasion to change beliefs, values, attitudes 
and behaviors."216 Poisoning the well can be particularly beneficial at 
winning over jurors who are motivated to reduce dissonance about 
self-image. Consider Justice Scalia's dissent from denial of certiorari: 
If it is uncertain how this Court will apply Sykes and the rest of our 
ACCA cases going forward, it is even more uncertain how our low-
er-court colleagues will deal with them. Conceivably, they will 
tive ones."). 
212. james P. Monacell, Comment, An Application of Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Resentenc-
ing and Other Reappearances by the Same judge, I LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 385,387 (1977). 
213. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 14, at 366; Simon, supra note I 0, at 49 ("Dissonance 
is reduced by way of spreading apart the decision alternatives: this typically entails buttressing one 
alternative by highlighting its positive features and playing down its negative ones, and derogat-
ing the competing alternative via emphasizing its negative features and minimizing its positive 
ones."). 
214. Cognitive Dissonance, CHANGINGMINDS.ORG, http://changingminds.org!explanations/ 
theories/cognitive_dissonance.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). Dan Simon also noted this idea: 
[D]issonance is deemed to arise between the acknowledgment of the behavior ("I just 
behaved in manner X") and the original attitude ("I believe that behavior X is 
wrong"). Dissonance occurs because of the tension between the positive self-
conception ("I am a moral person") and the negative cognition ("I just behaved in an 
immoral way"). Dissonance-reduction is a means of alleviating this tension. By alter-
ing the original belief to "I believe that behavior X is appropriate," the dissonance is 
reduced. 
Simon, supra note 10, at 52 n.218. 
215. See Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 214. 
216. Id. 
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simply throw the opinions into the air in frustration, and give free 
rein to their own feelings as to what offenses should be considered 
crimes of violence-which, to tell the truth, seems to be what we 
have done. (Before throwing the opinions into the air, however, 
they should check whether littering-or littering in a purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive fashion-is a felony in their jurisdiction. If 
so, it may be a violent felony under ACCA; or perhaps not.) 217 
In a somewhat subtle way, Justice Scalia wins over his reader by 
negatively characterizing the rest of the Court through visual image-
ry-painting a distinctly memorable image of the confusion that will 
surely come. If a lower-court judge had not yet formed an opinion 
about the Court's ACCA cases before reading the paragraph above, 
Justice Scalia forced that judge to decide. Dissonant thoughts about 
frustration and confusion quickly force the reader to make up her 
mind. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Perception and persuasion have a much closer link than we may 
consciously realize. This is helpful in understanding why people may 
perceive arguments that employ informal fallacies as being particu-
larly persuasive. Yet informal fallacies should not be viewed with an 
eye toward completely avoiding them-at least not in the law. Truth 
and justice hold a unique place together in the legal world. This is 
why the lawyer has a different end goal than both the sophist and 
the philosopher: the lawyer's attempt to seek justice for his client is 
presumed to be in line with truth. And the skilled, persuasive lawyer 
knows that pure appeals to reason alone using deductive reasoning 
and syllogisms are not sufficient to win his client's case. The lawyer 
understands persuasive advocacy, but he does not always recognize 
the labels that other disciplines have given his rhetorical techniques. 
Informal fallacies and cognitive biases are both errors in reason-
ing. Reasoning is both a mental and a verbal activity. Reasoning, 
then, includes the mental process of creating an argument, the oral 
process of reciting an argument, and the mental process of evaluat-
217. Derby v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2858, 2859-60 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
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ing another person's argument. To use a simple analogy, informal 
fallacies and cognitive biases are two sides of the same coin-one 
side represents faulty verbal or written reasoning, and one side rep-
resents faulty mental reasoning. Informal fallacies describe the ar-
gument, while cognitive biases describe the faulty mental processes 
of both the arguer and the listener. 
But errors in reasoning are not necessarily a bad thing, because 
not all people are perfectly rational. Informal fallacies can get a per-
son to become interested and actually care about the outcome in a 
case. And cognitive biases can be useful in making sense of the mil-
lions of stimuli in the world. In fact, informal fallacies, when used in 
moderation, should be viewed positively as persuasive tools that 
tend to induce errors in the way that other people process and think 
about information. They are used to manage what people perceive 
and eventually believe. Fair persuasion is not involved in trying to 
bend other people's wills to our own but in helping others to see 
things the same way we do. 
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